Goodbye Syriza?

Euro = Disneyland

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Brazen intervention: EU wants to overthrow Syriza Government in Greece

http://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2015/07/03/dreiste-intervention-eu-will-syriza-regierung-in-griechenland-stuerzen/

Well it had to happen, the writing is on the wall.

The EU and the IMF treatment of Ukraine, as opposed to Greece shows the nature of the hypocrites that wield the power within Europe.

It is obvious that Greece’s Syriza Government – a Marxist socialist party – are causing a headf&ck, to put it mildly to the EU and in particular the largest creditor Germany.

So obvious in fact that the Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis is on the outer (refer https://millermatters.wordpress.com/2015/05/08/goodbye-yanis/ ) and thereafter the Prime Minister Tsipras, has continued in vain on the need for the debts to be restructured and / or cancelled.

The attitude by both EU and IMF is totally brain dead – unless it is the intention of the EU and Germany to rid the EU of the Tsipras government that was democratically elected, through the irrevocable attitude towards the Greek debt.

Mind you the Tsipras government has done nothing to address the domestic problems in Greece, preferring instead to placate the voting public in addressing external debt issues. The truth be known – this government would lose any re-election, should it tackle the stupid inane state bureaucracy or pensions or unions.

[Edit, been advised that stupid inane state bureaucracy is an oxy-moron – I agree it is and they are!]

This is politics – in reality the IMF (and the EU) knew that the Greek debt was unsustainable in 2010 and according to its own rules should not have agreed to a loan agreement without debt restructuring.

“The European governments and banks influenced the decision. Papandreou’s government helped to present the elements of a banking crisis as a sovereign debt crisis in 2009. In 2013 the IMF admits that “a delayed debt restructuring also provided a window for private creditors to reduce exposures and shift debt into official hands”. (1)

So the European governments in essence are protecting the bond holders and in so doing ignore the fact that Greece’s debt is untenable and the interest is impossible to repay on governments net earnings.

Maybe a change of government would bring the necessary domestic reform first before the debt reform – this is highly likely in view of the EU and in particularly Germany’s position in all negotiations to date.

Their are two avenues for the the EU to force a change of government in Greece – capital and economic controls, which they have set in motion and may lead to a Syriza government voter backlash or invoking Article 352 as suggested by some commentators (removal of the Government by the EU.

When I researched the legal documents on ‘Lexus Nexus’ – the European legal documentation library – I had to search other sites for the ‘purpose’ of clauses, due to their ambiguity and listed amendments.

The drafters of the Maastricht Treaty wanted to ensure that monetary union went ahead, and express rules and ‘implied powers’ are available to the EU (Article 352). (1)

It could be argued that whilst the intention of this Article is to create a nationalist government Article 352(2) the amendments under Article 75 TFEU (Article III 160 ECT) appear to limit action to non government organizations – limit free movement of monies, freeze the assets of persons or corporations – as a means of fighting terrorism or organized crime etal.

The problem with this autocratic approach, is that use of these provisions by the EU would alert the member countries that their control (or lack thereof) on these issues is limited.

In my opinion the member states would then see the EU in a totally different light and it would then create individual country political posturing and civil unrest to the point that more countries would opt to leave the Union.

So implicitly but necessarily, the Treaties are generously designed by the drafter’s at saving the Economic Monetary Union – that many people believed were clearly ruled out – as an example the financial assistance under the ECB’s bond purchasing program – discussed and argued as illegal by the Constitutional Court in Germany but within the bounds of the EU Treaties. (2)

Anything is possible – just depends on how the European Court interprets the ‘intention’ of the specific article. An expulsion of Greece is out of the equation but these implied powers of the EU do seem to garner a lot of ambiguity.

It could be argued that the implied powers of the EU (most obviously, Article 352 of the TFEU) could be used to address the situation. This is a difficult argument since the Treaty drafters considered EMU to be ‘irrevocable’.(4)

But there are no explicit rules whatsoever are there?

Hand the matter to a lawyer and a favorable court and anything can be achieved and a generous approach to ‘anything’ which will save face for the EU.

Cato Institute on European Monetary Reform -1993

The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 is a classic example of the fatal conceit of central planners who think that they can impose their will on peoples and markets regardless of economic rationality or even common sense.

The treaty sets out a blueprint for significantly increasing the powers of the EC “government” in Brussels, establishing a European central bank (ECB), and replacing national currencies with a new common currency. The ratification process and the treaty itself are open to a number of serious objections.

The Maastricht Treaty is the wrong program implemented by the wrong people for the wrong reasons. It is a classic example of the fatal conceit of central planners, who have the supreme arrogance to think that they can impose their will on peoples and markets alike in total disregard of economic rationality or even basic common sense.

As Adam Smith once noted, allocating capital is too complicated a business to entrust to any government body, especially one presumptuous enough to fancy itself qualified to do the job. One suspects, however, that the lessons of Maastricht are lost on those who most need to learn them, and one can only wonder what they will. (5)

Well – that is goodbye from him and goodbye from me.

References

1. The testimony of Panagiotis Roumeliotis, the former representative of Greece at the IMF, on 15 June 2015 at a public hearing answering the questions of the Truth Committee.
http://greekdebttruthcommission.org/wp/

2. Article 352 TFEU
(1) If there is any action by the Union under the conditions laid down in the Treaties policies needed to attain one of the objectives of the Treaties, and in the Treaties the necessary powers not provided , the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after assent of the European Parliament take the appropriate measures. If these provisions are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after approval by the Euro-pean [sic] Parliament.

(2) The Commission shall draw national parliaments in the procedure for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in Article 5, paragraph 3 of the Treaty on European Union ‘attention to proposals which are based on this product.

(3) Measures based on this Article shall not entail harmonization of the laws of the Member States in cases where the Treaties exclude such harmonization.

(4) This item can not serve as a basis for attaining objectives pertaining to the common foreign and security policy and any acts adopted pursuant to this Article shall remain within the Article 40 paragraph 2 of the Treaty on European Union specified limits.

3. On January 14, Advocate General (AG) Cruz-Villalón issued his opinion in the reference for a preliminary ruling on Gauweiler et al. v Deutscher Bundestag on the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). The OMT Programme launched in September 2012 was part of a series of measures taken by the ECB in response to the Euro crisis accompanying the loan facilities (European Financial Stability Facility – EFSF, European Stability Mechansim – ESM).
– See more at: http://europeanlawblog.eu/?tag=pringle-case#sthash.a1V8VgTx.dpuf

4. https://books.google.ru/books?id=s9VbVAXS0G4C&pg=PA245&lpg=PA245&dq=EU+article+352+in+TFEU+purpose&source=bl&ots=LFgy0iHTOT&sig=qQQYDWi_gfH6WTu5O3arIN10R1Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ZCGXVe7MGobg8AXZhIWIDA&ved=0CC8Q6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=EU%20article%20352%20in%20TFEU%20purpose&f=false

5. http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-028.html

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